BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PEREMPTORY JUDGMENT __________________________________________________________________

This suit is being brought to challenge the constitutionality of Act 12 of 1988, which established a process in Pennsylvania for the siting of a Low Level nuclear waste repository. The passage of the Act was replete with constitutional violations of Sections one, two, and four of Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The unconstitutional machinations of the Pennsylvania legislature, as illustrated in the instant case, were also the subject of the Common Cause litigation which was recently decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PEREMPTORY JUDGMENT Under Rule 1098 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, a Peremptory Judgment will be entered by the Court if the "right of the plaintiff thereto is clear." See Pa.R.Civ. Pro. 1098. In addition, the Court is required to give "prior notice" to all p arties concerning the submission of the Motion for Peremptory Judgment. Such notice was given to both the Plaintiff and Defendants by an order issued December 10, 1996.

JUSTICIABILITY This Court has the power and the duty to ensure that legislation is passed that complies with Pennsylvania constitutional dictates. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Consumer Party v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158, 178, 507 A.2d 323, 333 (Pa. 1986) : While it is appropriate to give due deference to a co-equal branch of government as long as it is functioning within constitutional constraints, it would be a serious dereliction on our part to deliberately ignore a clear constitutional violation. The Court also declared that where the facts are agreed upon and the question presented is whether or not a violation of a mandatory constitutional provision has occurred, it is not only appropriate to provide judicial intervention, and if warranted a judicial remedy, we are mandated to do no less. Id. at 180, 507 A. 2d at 334.

I. FACTUAL SUMMARY In March, 1996, the plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a complaint. The complaint names the Treasurer, the Governor, and the Commonwealth as defendants. Plaintiff requests that this court declare unconstitutional Act 12 of 1988. The crux of the -2- complaint is that the General Assembly failed to follow constitutionally-mandated procedures when it passed Act 12. The Plaintiffs claim that the legislature violated sections one, two, and four of Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution. On May 13, 1996, the Commonwealth filed an answer and new matter. The Commonwealth's answer admits most of the facts in the complaint. The principal defense raised by the Commonwealth's new matter is laches. On July 30, 1996, the plaintiffs filed a reply to the Commonwealth's new matter. On July 22, 1996, the Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission filed a petition to intervene with this Court. A hearing was held on this petition for intervention on September 5, 1996. This Court entered an order denying the Commission's petition to intervene. This Court also denied the Commission's petition for reconsideration. On December 9, 1996, the Plaintiffs submitted a Motion for Peremptory Judgment. By order issued December 10, 1996, this Court established a briefing schedule for the submission of Briefs on the Motion for Peremptory Judgment. The Plaintiffs filed this Brief on December 30, 1996.

II. ARGUMENT A. ACT 12 WAS AMENDED TO CHANGE ITS ORIGINAL PURPOSE IN VIOLATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION AND DEFENDANTS HAVE ADMITTED THIS VIOLATION. Article III, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that "no bill shall be so altered or amended, on its passage through either House, as to change its original purpose." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has determined that this provision is mandatory. See Consumer Party of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158, -3- 179, 507 A.2d 323, 334 (Pa. 1986). In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that: 10. Act 12 began as Senate Bill 948 (Printers Number 1220) and related to the termination of spending of certain funds related to the Pennsylvania Conservation Corps. . . . 17. Third consideration was given to the Bill by the House of Representatives on January 26, 1987. It was amended by Amendment 0234 which replaced all of the language in the Bill with provisions dealing with the establishment of a nuclear low level radioactive waste disposal facility for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and struck out the old title of the bill. (Printers No. 1732). See Complaint at 4-6. In response to these allegations by the Plaintiff, the Defendants filed the following Answer: 10. DENIED as stated. To the contrary, Senate Bill 948 related to an extension of authority to use monies under the Recreational Improvement and Rehabilitation Act for an additional period of time to the extent they were to be used in conjunction with the Conservation Corps Act. . . . 17. ADMITTED. See Defendants' Answer and New Matter at 2. Clearly, the Defendants have admitted that the original bill (Senate Bill 948) was amended by 0234, the effect of which was to completely remove all language from Senate Bill 948 and to change the title of the Bill. In Common Cause of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 320 M.D. 1995 (November 13, 1995), this Court was presented with a similar situation, in which a Bill originally intended as a PUC appropriation became the vehicle for a general appropriations bill. In that case, this Court held that the process had violated Article III, Section one and stated that "we must agree with Common Cause that the metamorphosis of a bill originally containing only an appropriation from a restricted account in the general fund to the PUC into the GAA violated Article III, section 1." Id. at 10. This Court -4- concluded by stating that "[w]hen, as here, the constitutional bounds are exceeded, the judiciary must grant appropriate relief." Id. at 14. In Pennsylvania Association of Rental Dealers v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 554 A.2d 998 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989), the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania was presented with allegations that the passage of Act 15 of 1988 through the legislature violated Article III, sections one, two, and four of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Id. at 1000. In that case, the Commonwealth Court declared that the test to be applied to an alleged violation of these sections was the "germaneness" test, under which the Court would determine whether the "amendments are germane to, and do not wholly change, the general subject of the bill . . . " Id. at 1001. The Court then turned to an analysis of the legislative process under which the bill was passed, and determined that the initial bill, which dealt with payments of estimated taxes by farmers, was gutted and replaced by language that dealt with the Installment Sales Act. Id. In ruling for the Plaintiffs, the Court declared that '[i]n our view,! the latter is not germane to the former. Rather, the amendments finally passed by the House wholly changed the original bill." Id. Finally, the Court concluded by dismissing the Defendant's argument that the "amendments were germane as both bills effect the economic well being of the Commonwealth" by stating that "[t]o take such a broad view of germaneness test would, in our view, render that test meaningless." Id. at 1002. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also had an opportunity to apply these constitutional provisions to a piece of legislation in Consumer Party of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 507 A.2d 323 (Pa. 1986). In that case, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a bill that emerged from a conference committee with a new title that was "substantially different" from the original title. Id. at 326. Plaintiffs had alleged, in Commonwealth Court, that the legislation -5- violated Article III, section one, and several other constitutional provisions. The Court based its ruling against the Plaintiffs on the premise that a Conference Committee, by its very nature, was intended to produce a consensus, which might result in an altered bill. The Court also found it determinative that the bill's "purpose did not change after the bill left the Committee." Id. at 335. Thus, the Common Cause, Rental Dealers , and Consumer Party litigation all advance the proposition that this Court has the duty to investigate constitutional discrepancies of legislation passed by the Pennsylvania legislature. Each case also stands for the proposition that a material change in purpose of the legislation, in the absence of changes made in a Conference Committee, will be found to be in violation of Article III, section one of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In the instant case, the progression of the bill through the legislature followed a common course to that of the bills in the Rental Dealers and Common Cause litigation, and should therefore be ruled to be in violation of Article III, section one.

B. THE AMENDED ACT 12 WAS NOT REFERRED TO A COMMITTEE IN EITHER LEGISLATIVE HOUSE IN VIOLATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION AND DEFENDANTS HAVE ADMITTED THIS VIOLATION. Article III, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that "[n]o bill shall be considered unless referred to a committee..." In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that: 20. Senate Bill 948 [as amended] was returned to the Senate for concurrance in the House Amendment. The Senate concurred in the Amendment on February 3, 1988 without referral to a Senate Committee. . . . 22. Senate Bill 948 was signed in the Senate on February 8, 1988. It was signed in the House on February 8, 1988. See Complaint at 6-7. -6- The Defendants, through their Answer, filed the following in response: 20. ADMITTED. . . . 22. ADMITTED. See Defendants' Answer at 2. In the Common Cause litigation, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court found a violation of Article III, section 2 and stated that in Parker v. Department of Labor and Industry, 540 A.2d 313, 328 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), "we adopted the rule followed by other jurisdictions in relation to whether or not an amended bill need be referred to committee and considered on three separate days. We concluded that it did not, if the amendments are germane to, and do not wholly change, the general subject of the bill. Common Cause at 15. (emphasis in original`). Under this interpretation, the Court found a violation of Article III, section 2 based on its earlier finding that the amendment had "materially alter[ed] or amend[ed] the original bill." Id. In Pennsylvania Association of Rental Dealers, supra, the Commonwealth Court was presented with a bill, that after it was amended and its purpose changed, was not referred to "committee nor considered . . . three times" by the Pennsylvania Senate. Id. at 1001. This, the Court declared, was a violation of both "[s]ections 2 and 4 of Article III." Id. Thus, a finding that the amendment to the bill was not germane and the fact that the bill was never referred to a Senate committee, rendered the bill uncons titutional under the Court's Article III, section two analysis. In the instant case, the original Bill was gutted, its original subject matter deleted and replaced, and the title replaced. Act 12 of 1988, after its amendment as a vehicle to contain the Low-Level siting language, was never referred to a Committee in e ither -7- the Pennsylvania House or Senate. Since the original purpose of the bill was clearly altered or amended on is passage through the legislature, a finding that the passage of the Bill also violated Article III, section two is warranted.

C. THE AMENDED ACT 12 DID NOT RECEIVE THREE DAYS OF CONSIDERATION IN EITHER HOUSE IN VIOLATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION AND DEFENDANTS HAVE ADMITTED THIS VIOLATION. Article III, section four of the Pennsylvania Constitution states in part that "[e]very bill shall be considered on three different days in each House." In the Plaintiffs' Complaint, it was alleged that, after the original Bill was amended by the House o f Representatives, that 20. Senate Bill 948 was returned to the Senate for concurrance in the House Amendment. The Senate concurred in the Amendment on February 3, 1988 without referral to a Senate Committee. . . . 22. Senate Bill 948 was signed in the Senate on February 8, 1988. it was signed in the House on February 8, 1988. 23. Then Governor Robert P. Casey approved Senate Bill 948 on February 9, 1988, fourteen days after the altered Bill was reported from the House of Representatives. See Complaint at 6-7. To these allegations, the Defendants responded in the following manner: 20. ADMITTED. . . . 22. ADMITTED 23. ADMITTED. See Answer at 2. Once again, the "germaneness" test is determinative on the question of whether or not the passage of the bill violated Article III, section four of the Pennsylvania -8- Constitution. After its amendment by the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, the bill was not given three days of consideration. Immediately after the amendment gutted the original bill, it was presented for concurrence in the Senate. That concurrence was granted on February 3, 1988. In the House, it was apparent that many members were not placed on notice concerning the language of the amendment that replaced the original language of the bill. Representative Cowell, as reported in the House Legislativ e Journal, declared that "this is a comprehensive amendment, obviously, and it is for many of us the first opportunity to look at this particular set of papers." See House Legislative Journal 67 (January 26, 1988). Clearly, the failure to consider the bi ll for the requisite three days in either house was violative of Article III, section four of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

D. LACHES DOES NOT BAR THIS CHALLENGE TO THE PASSAGE OF ACT 12. (1) THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES DOES NOT APPLY TO A CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE It is settled Pennsylvania law that the equitable doctrine of laches is not applicable to a suit that challenges the constitutionality of a legislative act. As recently as 1988, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has upheld this interpretation of the laches principle. In Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1988), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was presented with a taxpayer challenge to the actions of the Governor in placing two vacant judicial offices on the ballot in an upcoming election. In that case, the taxpayers delayed the filing of the suit. In holding that the doctrine of laches would not bar the suit, the Court stated that "[w]e have not been able to discover any case which holds that laches will bar an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute as to its future operation." Id. at 188-89. -9- In Wilson v. City of Philadelphia, 195 A. 90 (Pa. 1937), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was presented with a statute that granted taxing powers to a non-elected school board in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court addressed the Defendants' argument that laches should bar the suit because the Plaintiffs brought suit eight years after the statute had been passed, and stated that "[t]he Act of 1929 is almost identical with the Act of 1921 in so far as taxation is concerned; in all these years no one has voiced an objection to its constitutionality. We have not been able to discover any case which holds that laches will bar an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute as to is future operation . . . Id. at 99. The Court also cited to Commonwealth v. Gilligan, 46 A. 124 (Pa. 1900), for the proposition that "laches will not ipso facto operate to prevent the court from declaring an act void in violation of the Constitution." Id. Finally, the Court declared that "this court must perform its duty, in spite of the delay." Id. at 100. In Commonwealth v. Gilligan, 46 A.124 (Pa. 1900), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the inapplicability of the laches defense to a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. In Gilligan, the Court declared that [t]he act has stood on the statute book without challenge for nearly a quarter of a century, and millions of dollars of school funds have been collected and disbursed under its provisions. While these are not reasons for refusing to declare it void if in contravention of the constitution, yet they are strongly persuasive that the act is not so clearly unconstitutional as it should be shown to be to make it our duty now to set it aside."Id. at 125 (citing In re Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. St. 349, 358, 43 A. 985). Therefore, the jurisprudence of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court makes it clear that laches shall not be applicable against a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. These rulings are firmly rooted in the principle that the concerns about the cons titutionality of legislation should not be subordinate to the concerns addressed by the laches defense. -10- (2)

DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF LACHES The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has stated that the establishment of the laches defense is not a proper subject for a summary judgment proceeding. In Tudor Development Group v. USF & G, that Court stated that "[w]hether laches applies is a factual question, making it an inappropriate basis for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings, unless the relevant facts are not in dispute." Id. at 496. In addition, the party asserting laches bears the burden of proving that it applies. Tudor Development Group v. USF & G, 768 F. Supp. 493 (M.D. Pa. 1991). See Wheeler v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 749 F. Supp. 660, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1990). The test, as outlined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1988), is whether Defendants have established "a) a delay arising from petitionerÕs failure to exercise due diligence; and, b) prejudice to the respondents resulting from the delay." Id. at 187. In addition, "[i]t is not enough to show delay arising from failure to exercise due diligence; for 'laches will not be imputed where no injury has resulted to the other party by reason of the delay.'" Tudor at 495. The issue is "whether the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to file or prosecute the claim." Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 764 v. Greenawalt, 919 F.Supp. 774 (M.D. Pa. 1996). See Hansel v. Hansel, 446 A.2d 1294 (Pa. Super. 1982). In their assertion of New Matter, Defendants contend that Plaintiff Stilp "was or should have been aware in 1988 of the procedures used in enacting Act 12." See Defendant's New Matter at 4. Defendants also contend that "[p]eti tioners Epstein and Linzey knew or should have known of the passage of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Act and should have informed themselves of its legislative history." In the Defendant's New Matter, the party has provided inadequate material upon which this court can make a determination concerning the -11- application of laches. Specifically, the element of lack of due diligence has not been shown in regard to each of the Plaintiffs Defendant alleges that Petitioner Stilp "should have known" of the unconstitutionality of the passage of Act 12 merely by his employment with the Pennsylvania House of Representatives and his assignment to the House Conservation Committee. This is clearly an inadequate base from which to argue that Petitioner Stilp should be left remediless. In dealing with a similar argument that was used in Ritter v. Commonwealth, 548 A.2d 1317 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), the Court in Pennsylvania Rental Dealers stated that "Ritter has no application to the present case because PARD does not consist of individual legislators who had an opportunity to challenge the procedures used during the legislative process." Pennsylvania Association of Rental Dealers, 554 A.2d at 1001 . In the instant case, the Defendant's attempt to impute the same level of knowledge to a staffer, Plaintiff Stilp, as they would to a legislator. Such a comparison is clearly inapplicable in the instant case and the assumption that a staff member would have the opportunity or knowledge to challenge the passage of a piece of legislation is clearly at odds with the facts. The Defendant alleges absolutely no factual basis for the application of the doctrine of laches to Petitioner Linzey or Epstein. Defendant simply makes the vague assertion that they "knew or should have known" that the passage of Act 12 violated the Pennsylvania Constitution. In addition, Defendants make the equally vague assertion that, even if they had not known, that they "should have informed themselves of its legislative history." See Defendants New Matter at 4. In addition to unreasonable delay, the Defendants "must demonstrate prejudice." Tudor at 495. "[D]elay alone, no matter how long, does not itself establish laches." Id. Defendants will not be prejudiced by a declaration that Act 12 was passed in violati on of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Defendants' claim that the state has -12- expended "$8,830,119.42 pursuant to ¤312 of the Act" in addition to "31,715,029.83" paid to Chem-Nuclear Systems "pursuant to its contract." See Defendants New Matter at 5, para.11. In Sprague, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dealt with a challenge to an election that had been announced six months prior to the initiation of the lawsuit and that had resulted in the expenditure of significant amounts of "time, money, and effort." 550 A .2d at 188. In that case, the Court cited to an earlier case in which the expenditure of immense amounts of monies did not act to bar the Court from declaring the challenged statute unconstitutional. The Court cited to the earlier case for the proposition that "[t]he act has stood on the statute book, without challenge for nearly a quarter of a century, and millions of dollars of school funds have been collected and disbursed under its provisions. . . [T]hese are not reasons for refusing to declare it void in contravention of the constitution. Id. at 189 (citing Commonwealth v. Gilligan, 46 A.124, 125 (Pa. 1900). Therefore, in cases in which the Defendants claimed they were prejudiced based on the expenditure of monies, Pennsylvania courts have declared that laches is inapplicable when the constitutionality of the statute is challenged by the Plaintiffs. Finally, the expenditure of monies under the Low-Level Act has not been prejudicial to the Defendants because at this point in time, no site has been selected for the low-level waste depository, a license application has not been submitted for the operat ion of the repository, and no construction has begun towards the low-level facility. Therefore, all monies expended constitute an investment towards the eventual construction of a low-level waste repository. When a constitutionally valid Act is passed to eventually site the low level waste repository, the legislature and the Department of Environmental Protection can utilize the information obtained from the prior outlays of money for operations carried out under a future statute. -13-

III. CONCLUSION Therefore, for the reasons outlined in this Brief, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court GRANT the MOTION FOR PEREMPTORY JUDGMENT and declare Act 12 of 1988 to be unconstitutional. We swear that the above is true and correct to the best of our knowledge, __________________________________________________________________

Gene Stilp, pro se Eric Epstein, pro se Thomas Linzey, pro se 1550 Fishing Creek Valley Rd. 5308 Brandywine Dr. 2859 Scotland Road Harrisburg, PA 17112 Harrisburg, PA 17110 Chambersburg, PA 17201 (717) 599-7700 (717) 540-5773 (717) 709-0457 Dated this 30th Day of December, 1996 -14- Certificate of Service of Process I, Gene Stilp, hereby swear and affirm that the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PEREMPTORY JUDGMENT was sent to the individuals listed below by the following method: FIRST CLASS MAIL PRE-PAID The BRIEF was sent to the following individuals: Catherine Baker Knoll 129 Finance Building Harrisburg, PA 17120 Thomas Ridge 225 Main Capitol Harrisburg, PA 17120 Calvin R. Koons Office of Attorney General 15th Floor, Strawberry Square Litigation Section Harrisburg, PA 17120 I certify that the above is true and correct to the best of our knowledge. _____________________ Gene Stilp, pro se 1550 Fishing Creek Valley Road Harrisburg, PA 17112 (717) 599-7700 Dated this 30th Day of December, 1996 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA GENE STILP, ERIC EPSTEIN, : THOMAS LINZEY : : Petitioners : : v. : : No. 336 M.D. 1996 : : Catherine Baker Knoll, Treasurer : of the Commonwealth of : Pennsylvania : : Thomas Ridge, Governor : of the Commonwealth of : Pennsylvania : : Commonwealth of Pennsylvania : __________________________________________________________________

ORDER

__________________________________________________________________ AND NOW, upon consideration of the Brief of the Plaintiffs for Peremptory Judgment, this Court GRANTS the Motion for Peremptory Judgment and declares Act 12 of 1988 to be unconstitutional under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Clerk shall enter this judgment accordingly. ___________________________ Commonwealth Court Judge Dated this _______Day of January, 1996. IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA GENE STILP, ERIC EPSTEIN, : THOMAS LINZEY : : Petitioners : : v. : : No. 336 M.D. 1996 : : Catherine Baker Knoll, Treasurer : of the Commonwealth of : Pennsylvania : : Thomas Ridge, Governor : of the Commonwealth of : Pennsylvania : : Commonwealth of Pennsylvania : __________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX TO THE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PEREMPTORY JUDGMENT __________________________________________________________________

AND NOW, the Plaintiffs in the above captioned case, present this Appendix to their Brief in Support of Peremptory Judgment. This Appendix contains the following Exhibits:

Exhibit 1: Initial Complaint in the above captioned litigation.

Exhibit 2: Answer and New Matter in the above captioned litigation.

Exhibit 3: Senate Bill 948 (Printer's Number 1220).

Exhibit 4: Senate Bill 948 (Printer's Number 1680).

Exhibit 5: Senate Bill 948 (Printer's Number 1732).

Table of Contents

I. FACTUAL SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

II. ARGUMENT A. A. ACT 12 WAS AMENDED TO CHANGE ITS ORIGINAL PURPOSE IN VIOLATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION AND DEFENDANTS HAVE ADMITTED THIS VIOLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

B. THE AMENDED ACT 12 WAS NOT REFERRED TO A COMMITTEE IN EITHER LEGISLATIVE HOUSE IN VIOLATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION AND DEFENDANTS HAVE ADMITTED THIS VIOLATION . . . . . . . . . . . 6

C. THE AMENDED ACT 12 DID NOT RECEIVE THREE DAYS OF CONSIDERATION IN EITHER HOUSE IN VIOLATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION AND DEFENDANTS HAVE ADMITTED THIS VIOLATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

D. LACHES DOES NOT BAR THIS CHALLENGE TO THE PASSAGE OF ACT 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

(1) THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES DOES NOT APPLY TO A CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE. . . . . . . . . . . . .9

2) DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF LACHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

III. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14